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
8 June 1971

#### MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Contents of Black Notebooks Kept in ONE by Soviet Military Estimators

## VOLUME I: MILITARY ESTIMATES AND RESEARCH

- 1.\* ONE Staff Memorandum No. 10-59, by Howard Stoertz, Jr., Schedule of Estimates on Soviet Military Capabilities, 7 April 1959, 4 pp. plus table, S. Redefines requirements for estimates of Soviet military capabilities as mission oriented estimates of a. long range attack, b. air defense, c. land campaigns, and d. naval warfare. Urges that ONE undertake an estimate on long range strike forces.
- 2. DCID No. 3/4, Production of Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence, USIB-D-33.2/1 (Rev.), 3 February 1959, Final Intelligence Board-approved Draft, 5 pp., S.
- 3. DCID No. 3/3, Production of Atomic Energy Intelligence, USIB-D-32.2/1 (Rev.), 27 January 1959, Final Intelligence Board-approved Draft, 6 pp., S.
- 4. DCID No. 3/5, Production of Scientific and Technical Intelligence, USIB-D-34.2/1 (Rev.), 3 February 1959, Final Intelligence Board-approved Draft, 6 pp., S.
- 5. Memorandum to Mr. Kirkpatrick's Committee, by Sherman Kent, AD/ONE, ONE and the Preparation of Military Estimates, 29 January 1962. 5 pp. C. Why coordination of military estimating should not be transferred from ONE to DIA.
- 6. Memorandum to DDI from Otto E. Guthe, AD/RR, The Role of ORR in Military Intelligence, 21 January 1962, 3 pp., S. with two supporting Annexes of 7 and 2 pp. Sent to ONE for concurrence. This was the carbon copy routed to ONE; no indication whether concurrence was given. Recommends



<sup>\*</sup>Numbers assigned by CIA Historical Staff.

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that ORR be assigned 100 additional positions to support military estimating.

- 7. Draft memorandum, unaddressed, unsigned, undated, The Soviet Military Problem and the Research and Organization of the DDI. Endorsed: Proctor's Notes Fall 1961, 5 pp. Classification not shown.
- 8. Clipped article, "Program Packaging -- Opportunity and Peril," Capt. Harry C. White, USN, and Lt. Cmdr. Robert J. Massey, USN, US Naval Institute, Proceedings, Vol. 87, No. 12 (December, 1961), pp. 23-35. Discusses McNamara and Hitch proposals for mission oriented budgeting.
- 9. Draft memorandum, unaddressed, by Howard Stoertz, Jr., DDI Analysis of Sino-Soviet Bloc Military and Related Subjects, 12 May 1962, 2 pp. Endorsed: Shown only to R. J. Smith, S. Kent, S. Eyes Only, with 7 p. signed attachment. Recommends combination of military analysts of OSI, ORR, OCI, and ONE into a new DDI office to serve more effectively the needs of current intelligence, indications, and national estimates.
- 10. Notes on Procedure, by Howard Stoertz, Estimative History of Soviet Military Programs and Policy Since 1950, 2d draft, 22 March 1963, 2 pp. S. Attached is 2 pp. list: Examples of Work Completed or in Process, 26 March 1963, C.
- 11. Memorandum to DDI, prepared by Howard Stoertz, signed by Sherman Kent, AD/NE, Use of Techniques Described in RAND Memo No. 2892-PR, August 1962, dated 10 January 1963, 3 pp., copy 69, S. Reviews actions by DDI to implement RAND proposals for improvement of US estimates of Soviet military capability. CIA/DIA Joint Analysis Group (JAG) has been established and will work on long range studies recommended by RAND. Cites other actions taken by DDI to implement RAND proposals.
- 12. Memorandum to DDI, by \_\_\_\_\_ Chief, JAG, Ideas in RAND Memo (2892-PR) as Reflected in JAG Papers, 17 December 1962, 2 pp., S. DDI is implementing RAND's proposals for long range (10 year) mission oriented projections; critique of RAND proposals.
- 13. Terms of Reference of Sino-Soviet Weapons Analysis Coordinating Group (Short Title: Weapons Coordinating Group), unsigned, 3 December 1962, 2 pp., S., prepared in OAD/RR.

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- 14. Coordination of Intelligence on Strategic Weapons Systems and Programs, DDI Notice No. 50-100-34, 18 February 1963, signed by Ray S. Cline, DDI, 3 pp., S. Requires coordination of papers representing DDI or Agency views or for dissemination outside Agency. Excludes contributions to NIE's, which are however to be circulated to interested components for comment.
- 15. Memorandum for DDI, by Otto E. Guthe, Review of Part IV of the Loftus/Marshall Paper, 29 March 1963, 1 p., S., forwarding Tabs A and B, 2 pp. each, S. Summarizes review by Strategic Weapons Coordinating Group.
- 16. Record of the Eighth Meeting of the Strategic Weapons Coordinating Group, unsigned, 8 April 1963, 2 pp., copy 1105, issued by OAD/RR, S.
- 17. Memorandum for DDI, by Otto E. Guthe, Need for Historical Study of Soviet Military Developments, 29 March 1963, 2 pp., Copy 1023, with 1 p. attachment, summarizing discussion of subject by Strategic Weapons Coordinating Group, S. Stoertz to undertake study.
- Weapons Coordinating Group, by

  USAF (Ret.), ONE Member, WCG, Clarification of ONE's Role
  in Coordination of Intelligence Papers on Strategic Weapon
  Systems and Programs, 18 July 1963, 6 pp., S. ONE wishes
  to be consulted before other DDI offices issue papers in
  the current intelligence, scientific, or military economic
  fields which present evidence or analysis tending in a
  significant way to confirm, amplify, modify, change, or
  fill gaps in estimates on strategic weapon systems and
  programs.

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Working Paper - CIA Distribution Only), ONE's Need for Research Support on Soviet Strategic Programming, 21 December, 1961, 1 p., S. Note to the Board to explain that the transmitted attachment was written in response to numerous requests for a new look at the military estimating process. Attached is Memorandum, same number, subject, and date, signed by R. J. Smith, and Howard Stoertz, Jr., 10 pp., S. Creation of DIA does not replace need for ONE military estimates. US policy makers require long range military estimates for planning. In future military estimates more emphasis should be placed on current Soviet R&D; costing, Soviet strategic thinking, and Soviet military programming.

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- Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, by Charles J. Hitch, ASD (Comp), Improved Intelligence Estimates and Analysis of Our Theatre Force Requirements, dated in pencil 17 November 1961, prepared by A. Enthoven, 15 November 1961, 1 p. thermofax of carbon copy, S. Enclosed is copy of memorandum from Hitch to Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, Director, DIA, Future Needs Program for Intelligence Estimates and Analysis of the Intelligence, undated, prepared by A. Enthoven, 15 November 1961, 4 p. thermofax of carbon Hitch to SecDef: in answer to the Secretary's question of how to develop a better basis to set requirements for general purpose or theatre forces. It is important that we do so and it can be done. In past services have overstated Communist theatre force capabilities in order to make a strong case for their own. Encloses memorandum to Gen. Carroll making it clear DIA is responsible for estimating the Soviet defense program as a whole, consistent with observed capabilities and budget levels, using a programming approach. Hitch to Gen. Carroll: to support new methods of planning and programming in Comptroller's office, must improve intelligence estimating. To support US policy making decisions on a weapon system basis must have comparable long range Soviet estimates for at least five years in future, based not on traditional military attitude to requirements, but on analysis of weapon systems.
- 22. A. W. Marshall, J. E. Loftus, and G. E. Pugh, Project Lamp, Systems Analysis and the Military Estimates Process, 3 April 1961, 33 pp, S. Organized in four major parts, preceded by Table of Contents and Foreword:
  - I. Critiques of Current Military Estimates Procedures Using 11-8-60 as an Example.

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II. Use of Systems Analysis in Improving Mid-Term Military Estimates.

III. Supporting Studies for Improving Estimates of Soviet Military Capabilities.

IV. Recommendations.

Recommends that CIA undertake: 1. A continuing program of Soviet requirements calculations in support of military NIE's. 2. A major program of supporting studies, using systems analysis. Immediate augmentation of ONE Staff by 5-6'persons, supported by a special pool of experienced systems consultants. 3. On a mid-term basis, develop an in house military analysis capability of roughly 25 technical persons, by expansion of ONE or other means to project the Soviet military posture by systematically simulating Soviet military planning. Enumerates questions for policy determination concerning size, location, organization, and administration of such a group.

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(The foregoing list was compiled from the first of two black looseleaf notebooks, passed to the Chief of the CIA Historical Staff by ONE, May 1971.  In conversation on 8 June 1971, indicated to the DCh/HS that these notebooks were compiled and maintained	25X1 25X1
by Mr. Howard Stoertz, Jr., as a member of the ONE Staff responsible for Soviet military estimating. The two notebooks will be accessioned into the Historical Collection of the CIA Historical Staff as HS/HC 603 and 604.)	
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Deputy Chief, CIA Historical Staff

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ABSTRACT				
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Volume I:	Military E	stimators and Research		
Volume II:	: Quantitativ	e Estimates, Major Sovie <sup>.</sup>	t Force Components	
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Volume III	:Same as II			

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